Introduction
Two key changes can arguably be said to have characterized the economic landscape in recent UK history: …rst, labour market reforms enforced by the Thatcher government in the late 1980s and, second, the introduction of an explicit in ‡ation target in 1992, which entrusted the monetary authority with the mandate of stabilizing in ‡ation around a numerical target.
Subsequently, the UK economy experienced a step change in macroeconomic performance. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the growth rate of the GDP de ‡ator, an in ‡ation indicator, in the United Kingdom from 1970 to the present: it suggests that both real output growth and in ‡ation have been more stable than they were in the 1970s and the 1980s. Moreover, the level of in ‡ation has decreased remarkably since the early 1990s. Would the introduction of these policy changes have produced a di¤erent economic outlook if they had been accomplished in the earlier decades? And, if so, to what extent, if at all, might each of these two changes have played a role?
To answer these questions, this paper uses a model that details the functioning of the UK economy during the 1970s and 1980s which is able to incorporate the policy reforms described.
It then uses the model to draw inferences about how these policy changes might have altered the economic outlook if they were introduced in the early 1970s.
The analysis is conducted using a microfounded New Keynesian model where …rms face a cost to adjusting nominal prices and the labour market is characterized by search frictions.
The theoretical framework also incorporates a monetary authority that conducts monetary policy by setting the nominal interest rate in reaction to deviations of in ‡ation from its target and output from its long-run equilibrium. Unlike the explicit in ‡ation targeting framework introduced in 1992, where the target of in ‡ation is constant, during the 1970s and 1980s, the monetary authority could be perceived as having an implicit time-varying in ‡ation target, where the target was allowed to change in reaction to exogenous disturbances. Although the monetary authority never explicitly announced an in ‡ation target before 1992, to the extent that "in ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,"as suggested by Friedman (1968) , changes in actual in ‡ation should not have taken place without changes in at least the monetary authority's implicit in ‡ation target. Hence, this modelling strategy seems an appropriate representation of the conduct of monetary policy before the introduction of an explicit and constant in ‡ation target in 1992. The outcome is a setting similar to those of Blanchard and Galì (2010) , Zanetti (2011) and Ireland (2007) , which o¤ers a detailed description of the optimizing behaviour of households, …rms, the monetary authority, and their interactions in the determination of macroeconomic outcomes. The model is then taken to the data and estimated on the UK 1971-1991 period, to provide a detailed characterization of the UK economy prior to these policy changes. The econometric estimation separates out the policy parameters, such as those representing monetary policy and the structure of the labour market, which may vary due to changes in policy, from those which represent the household's preference and …rm's technology, which ought to be policy-invariant. Hence, the model is immune to Lucas' (1976) critique and can be used to draw inferences about how the introduction of these policy changes may alter the economic outlook. For this reason, counterfactual scenarios, described below, are used to determine to what extent either labour market reforms, or changes in the monetary policy framework, or both, could explain the changed economic outlook.
The counterfactual scenarios presented in this paper aim to establish whether the labour market reforms designed to reduce the unions' power and the replacement ratio of unemployment bene…ts, and the changes to the monetary policy framework, such as the constant in ‡ation target and the consequent increased weight assigned to in ‡ation as an objective of monetary policy, would have changed the economic outlook if they had been introduced in the earlier decades. The exercise therefore consists of imposing these policy changes on the estimated model for the period 1971-1991 to establish to what extent, if at all, each of them would have altered the economic outlook. The …ndings of this exercise suggest that labour market reforms are unlikely to have produced a considerably di¤erent economic outlook. Although a decrease in either unemployment bene…ts or in the power of unions generates a lower level of in ‡ation, the volatility of in ‡ation and output growth signi…cantly increases.
The e¤ects of changes in the monetary policy framework are mixed. The degree of reaction to deviations of in ‡ation from the target is important for explaining the lower variance of in ‡ation, output growth and the reduced in ‡ation level. On the other hand, the introduction of a constant in ‡ation target, or a monetary policy that responds more forcefully to output ‡uctuations, actually increases the volatility of in ‡ation and output growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates this paper to the literature, Section 3 provides an overview of the economic context, Section 4 sets up the model, Section 5 derives the equilibrium and the model's solution, Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper closely relates to two branches of the literature. First, a number of works investigate the causes of the reduced macroeconomic volatility in the UK from the early 1990s onward, the period often referred to as an era of "Great Moderation". Benati (2008) uses econometric techniques to …nd that smaller shocks might have caused the muted economic outlook. Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2007) use a time-varying VAR to show that changes in the transmission of demand shocks and the reduced volatility of supply and monetary policy shocks account for the improved macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, Nelson and Batini (2009) document that the change in view of policymakers about the importance of monetary policy, that culminated with the introduction of in ‡ation targeting, is likely responsible for the post-1990 UK macroeconomic stability. Bianchi, Mumtaz, and Surico (2009) use a FAVAR model to show that the slope of the yield curve is related to a lower and stable in ‡ation in the UK. Unlike these works, this paper is the …rst to investigate the importance of labour market reforms and the introduction of a constant in ‡ation target using an estimated, dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model. It therefore provides an empirically grounded assessment of the e¤ect of these reforms and enables the model to quantify the structural shocks, which are used to derive the counterfactual scenarios. A closely related study is Blanchard and Galì (2007) , which investigates the e¤ect of oil shocks on the US economy. Like this paper, they …nd that changes in the labour market, by decreasing real wage rigidities, and a more credible monetary policy, which reacted more aggressively to in ‡a-tion, played a role in the more muted e¤ect of oil shocks and therefore the di¤erent economic outlook in the post-1980 period compared to the 1970s. However, both their approach and focus are di¤erent. In Blanchard and Galì (2007) the labour market rigidities are not microfounded, since they assume that wages are exogenously prevented from adjusting, whereas here they are derived from …rst principles. While they interpret the degree of wage rigidities as a measure of changes in the labour market, this paper investigates the e¤ect of two wellde…ned labour market reforms. Moreover, they calibrate the model's parameters while here the estimation uses the data to determine the parameters'values. Furthermore, the analysis here also focuses on the introduction of a constant in ‡ation target, which is uncovered in Blanchard and Galì (2007) .
Second, this paper also contributes to the estimation of structural models for the UK economy, which is an understudied area of research, as emphasized by DiCecio and Nelson (2007) . Unlike DiCecio and Nelson (2007) , who estimate the model using a vector autoregression to match the responses of variables to a monetary policy shock, this paper uses maximum likelihood estimation to fully exploit the ability of the structural model to match the data. In addition, this paper also incorporates labour market frictions, which, as advocated by Nickell (1997) , are an important feature of the UK labour market, and therefore provides a more accurate description of the economy. This paper also relates to recent works by Kamber and Millard (2008) and Harrison and Oomen (2010) who estimate an array of New Keynesian models to investigate the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK. Finally, the paper is also related to Faccini, Millard and Zanetti (2013) who estimate a general equilibrium model with labour market frictions on UK data. While these works focus on the period from the 1980s onward, this paper is the …rst study to provide a detailed description of the economy during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the focus here is broader as it uses the model to perform normative analysis to determine the relevance of labour market reforms and the introduction of in ‡ation targeting.
The Economic Context
To place the analysis in context, before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth describing the economic situation and the actual policy changes that took place. In the late 1970s the UK economic performance had been subdued: Bean and Crafts (1996, Table 6 .1) document that the UK had the lowest growth rate of GDP per capita among a sample of 12 OECD countries and that output dropped more sharply during the 1980s recession than in other developed counties. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that output growth was low during the 1970s, and that the second half of the 1980s was characterized by a high level of growth. Interestingly the strong economic performance of the UK economy coincided with far-reaching labour market and monetary policy reforms.
In the late 1980s the Thatcher government introduced a series of labour market reforms aimed at reducing the distortions in the labour market considered responsible for the poor performance of the UK economy. In particular, as pointed out by Minford (1983) , the unemployment bene…t system and the power of the unions were regarded as particularly damaging.
Consequently, legislation such as the Trade Union Act of 1984 and the Employment Act of 1988 led, as documented by Blanch ‡ower and Freeman (1993) , to a steady decline in union density and to a reduction of the replacement ratio of unemployment bene…ts. In particular, Gregory (1998) documents that union membership declined from 11.7 millions in 1979 to 7.2 million in 1996 and union density of employment also declined from 50% in 1979 to 31.3% in 1996. Moreover, Millward, Stevens, Smart and Hawes (1992) reports that the decline of the unions'role was concentrated in the late 1980s.
In the late 1980s the UK government started to reconsider the monetary policy framework. Following Britain's departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, established an explicit numerical target for the rate of in ‡ation and gave the legal mandate to the monetary authority to maintain in ‡ation around the target in the medium-term. The 1998 Bank of England Act made the Bank independent to set interest rates. The Bank of England became accountable to parliament and started to implement the annual explicit target for the rate of in ‡ation set by the Government.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows that in ‡ation became remarkably low and stable from the early 1990s.
The Economic Environment
The theoretical model resembles those used by Blanchard and Galì (2010) and Zanetti (2009 Zanetti ( , 2011 ) that combine a standard New Keynesian model with labour market search. In addition, monetary policy accounts for time-varying in ‡ation target as in Ireland (2007) The labour market is similar to that in Blanchard and Galì (2010) , which is based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of search and matching. This framework relies on the assumption that the processes of job search and recruitment are costly for both the …rm and the worker. Job creation takes place when a …rm and a searching worker meet and agree to form a match at a negotiated wage, which depends on the parties' bargaining power. The match continues until the parties exogenously terminate the relationship. When this occurs, job destruction takes place and the worker moves from employment to unemployment, and the …rm can either withdraw from the market or hire a new worker. a markup over its marginal cost, and it faces a cost to adjusting its nominal price, as in Rotemberg (1982) . This cost to price adjustment allows the monetary authority to in ‡uence the behavior of real variables in the short-run.
The monetary authority is modelled with a modi…ed Taylor (1993) rule as in Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) : it adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of output from its steady-state and in ‡ation from its target. Similarly to Ireland (2007) , monetary policy also allows the in ‡ation target to adjust in response to exogenous shocks.
The next section describes the agents'tastes, technologies, the policy rule, and the structure of the goods and labour market in detail.
The Representative Household
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, the representative household maximizes the expected utility
where the variable C t is consumption, is the discount factor 0 < < 1, and a t is the aggregate preference shock that follows the autoregressive process
where a < 1. The zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation " at is normally distributed with standard deviation a . The representative household enters period t with bonds B t 1 . At the beginning of the period, the household receives a lump-sum nominal transfer the gross nominal interest rate between t and t + 1. The household uses its income for consumption, C t , and carries B t bonds into period t + 1, subject to the budget constraint
where N t lies between 0 and 1. for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Thus the household chooses fC t ; B t g 1 t=0
to maximize its utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Letting t = P t =P t 1 denote the gross in ‡ation rate, and t the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (3), the …rst order conditions for this problem are
and
According to equation (4), the Lagrange multiplier must equal the household's marginal utility of consumption. Equation (5), once equation (4) is substituted in, is the representative household's Euler equation that describes the consumption decision.
The Labour Market
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, the ‡ow into employment results from the number of workers who survive from the exogenous separation, and the number of new hires, H t . Hence, total employment evolves according to
where N t (i) and H t (i) represent the number of workers employed and hired by …rm i in period t, and is the exogenous separation rate and 0 < < 1. For all t = 0; 1; 2; :::, the fraction of aggregate employment and hires supplied by the representative household must
It is convenient to introduce the variable x t , labour market tightness:
and assume, as in Blanchard and Galì (2010) , full participation in the labour market such that
is the beginning of the period unemployment. Finally, it is useful to de…ne
the fraction of the population left without a job after recruitment. Since all new hires are from the part of unemployed workers, 0 < x t < 1. Hence, x t also represents the probability that an unemployed worker …nds a job.
Let W N t , and W U t , denote the marginal value of the expected income of an employed, and unemployed worker respectively. The employed worker earns a wage, su¤ers disutility from work, and might lose her job with probability . Hence, the marginal value of a new match is:
This equation states that the marginal value of a job for a worker is given by the real wage and the expected-discounted net gain from being either employed or unemployed.
The unemployed worker expects to move into employment with probability x t . Hence, the marginal value of unemployment is:
This equation states that the marginal value of unemployment is made up of unemployment bene…ts together with the expected-discounted capital gain from being either employed or unemployed. Similarly to Zanetti (2011) , unemployment bene…ts are set as a proportion, b , of the established wage, such that b t = b w t , where b represents the replacement ratio.
The structure of the model guarantees that a realized job match yields some pure economic surplus. The share of this surplus between the worker and the …rm is determined by the wage level, in addition to compensating each side for its costs from forming the match. As in Pissarides (2000) , the wage is set according to the Nash bargaining solution. The worker and the …rm split the surplus of their matches with the absolute share , and 0 < < 1. The di¤erence between equation (10) and (11) determines the worker's surplus. The …rm's surplus is simply given by foregone cost of hiring, G t , which, as in Blanchard and Galì (2010) , is an increasing function of aggregate technology, z t , and labour market tightness:
where 0, and B 0. 2 The aggregate technology, z t , follows the autoregressive process
where z < 1. The zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation " zt is normally distributed with standard deviation z . Hence, the total surplus from a match is the sum of the worker's and the …rm's surpluses, given by W N t W U t + G t . Nash bargaining sets the worker's surplus as a fraction of the total surplus,
, and therefore the wage bargaining rule for a match is:
Substituting equations (10) and (11) in this last equation produces the agreed wage:
where is the bargaining power of the worker. Equation (14) shows that the wage equals the unemployment bene…ts together with current hiring costs, and the expected savings in terms of the future hiring costs if the match continues. 3 The in ‡uence of these last two terms on the wage depends on the relative power of the worker in the wage bargain.
The Goods Market
As described above, the production sector is comprised of a representative …nished-goodsproducing …rm, and a continuum of intermediate-goods-producing …rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1], characterized by staggered price-setting as in Rotemberg (1982) .
The Representative Finished-Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; :::, the representative …nished-goods-producing …rm uses Y t (i) units of each intermediate good i 2 [0; 1], purchased at nominal price P t (i), to produce Y t units of the …nished product at constant returns to scale technology
where t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, as …rst introduced by Smets and Wouters (2007) , Steinsson (2003 ), and Ireland (2004 . This parameter follows the autoregressive process
where < 1. The zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation " t is normally distributed with standard deviation .
Hence, the …nished-goods-producing …rm chooses Y t (i) for all i 2 [0; 1] to maximize its
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. the …rst order conditions for this problem are
for all i 2 [0; 1] and t = 0; 1; 2; :::. The aggregate shocks t can be interpreted as intermediategoods-producing …rm markup over marginal cost.
Competition drives the …nished-goods-producing …rm's pro…t to zero at equilibrium. This zero pro…t condition implies that
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
The Representative Intermediate-Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; :::, the representative intermediate-goods-producing …rm hires 
Since the intermediate goods are not perfect substitutes in the production of the …nal goods, the intermediate-goods-producing …rm faces an imperfectly competitive market. During each period t = 0; 1; 2; ::: it sets the nominal price P t (i) for its output, subject to satisfying the representative …nished-goods-producing …rm's demand. The intermediate-goodsproducing …rm faces a quadratic cost to adjusting nominal prices, measured in terms of the …nished goods and given by
where p > 0 is the degree of adjustment cost and is the steady-state gross in ‡ation rate.
This relationship, as stressed in Rotemberg (1982) , accounts for the negative e¤ects of price changes on customer-…rm relationships. These negative e¤ects increase in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall scale of economic activity, Y t .
The problem for the …rm is to choose fP t (i); N t (i); H t (i)g 1 t=0 to maximize its total market value given by
where the variable D t (i) is pro…ts, subject to the constraints imposed by (6)- (8), (12) and (17). In equation (18), t t =P t measures the marginal utility value to the representative household of an additional dollar in pro…ts received during period t and
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Thus the …rm chooses fN t (i); P t (i)g 1 t=0 to maximize the pro…t (19) subject to the demand function (16), the production technology (17), and law of employment accumulation (6). Solving equation (6) for H t (i) and substituting the outcome, together with equation (16), into equation (19), and letting t denote the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on equation (17), permits to write the …rst order conditions for this problem as
Equation (20) is the …rm's labour supply condition which equates the real wage with the marginal product of labour minus the hiring costs to pay in period t, plus the expected saving on the hiring costs forgone in period t+1, if the job is not dismissed. Equation (21) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve in its non-linearized form and it states that the …rm sets prices as a markup over marginal cost, accounting for price adjustment costs. As Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Chadha and Sun (2008) point out, the presence of labour market search frictions enables the New Keynesian Phillips curve to track more precisely in ‡ation ‡uctuations.
The Monetary Authority
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, the monetary authority conducts monetary policy using a modi…ed Taylor (1993) rule,
where R and Y are the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate and output, and t is the monetary authority time-varying in ‡ation target for the period t. According to equation (22), the monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to movements in output from its steady-state and in ‡ation from the target. As pointed out in Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) and Nelson (2003) , this modelling strategy for the central bank consistently describes the conduct of monetary policy in the UK since the early 1970s. The monetary policy shock v t follows the autoregressive process
where v < 1. The zero-mean, serially uncorrelated policy shock " vt is normally distributed, with a standard deviation v . Similarly to Ireland (2007) , the time-varying in ‡ation target t evolves according to
such that it may vary exogenously, when > 0, and may adjust to preference, cost-push, and technology shocks, when [ a ; ; z ] > 0. Note that, as in Ireland (2007), since negative realization of " t and " zt and positive realization of " at increase prices, positive values for , z and a generate more persistent movements in the in ‡ation target. The presumption here, as detailed at the outset, is that changes in in ‡ation should not have happened without changes in at least the implicit in ‡ation target, and that the implicit in ‡ation target reacts to shocks similarly to the underlying in ‡ation.
Equilibrium and Solution
In a symmetric, dynamic, equilibrium, all intermediate-goods-producing …rms make identical
and P t (i) = P t , for all
i 2 [0; 1] and t = 0; 1; 2; :::. In addition, the market clearing conditions T t = M t M t 1 and B t = B t 1 = 0 must hold for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::. These conditions, together with the …rm's pro…t conditions (19) and the household's budget constraint (3), produce the aggregate resource constraint
where the term G t H t expresses the resources spent in hiring. Substituting the Lagrange multiplier, t , from equation (4) into equations (5), (14), and (20)- (21), and deriving the labour market equilibrium condition by combining the agreed wage (14) with the labour demand equation (20), the model describes the behavior of 14 endogenous variables fb t ; C t ; G t ; H t ; t ; t ; N t ; t ; t ; R t ; U t ;
and 4 exogenous shocks fa t ; t ; v t ; z t g. The equilibrium is then described by the representative household's …rst order conditions (4) and (5), the law of employment (6), the de…nition of labour market tightness (7), the de…nition of unemployment accumulation (8), the de…nition of cost per hire (12), the agreed wage (14), the production function (17), the labour market equilibrium condition (20), the New Keynesian Phillips curve (21), the monetary authority policy rule (22), the time-varying in ‡ation target equation (24), the aggregate resource constraint (25), the de…nition of unemployment bene…ts, and the speci…cation of the exogenous shocks as in equations (2), (13), (15), and (23).
The equilibrium conditions do not have an analytical solution. Instead, the model's dynamics is characterized by log-linearizing them around the steady-state. The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are
where a hat on a variable denotes the logarithmic deviation from its steady-state and a variable without the time index represents its value at the steady-state. The solution to this system is derived using Klein (2000) , which is a modi…cation of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) , and takes the form of a state-space representation. This latter can be conveniently used to compute the likelihood function in the estimation procedure.
Estimation and Findings
The econometric estimation uses UK quarterly data for output growth, consumption growth, the nominal interest rate, in ‡ation and the growth rate of wages for the sample period 1971:1 through 1991:4. Output growth is de…ned as the quarterly growth rate of gross domestic product at basic prices; consumption growth is de…ned as the quarterly growth rate of …nal consumption expenditure; the nominal interest rate is de…ned as quarterly averages of daily readings on the three-month UK Treasury bill rate; in ‡ation is de…ned as the quarterly growth rate of the GDP de ‡ator; and wages growth is de…ned as the quarterly growth rate of the Average Earnings Index. All the data are taken from the O¢ ce of National Statistics data set, with the exception of the series of the three-month UK Treasury bill rate which is from the Statistical Interactive Database. The data are demeaned prior to the estimation.
As in other similar studies, such as Ireland (2004), a …rst attempt to estimate the model produced implausible values for the discount factor. Thus the real interest rate is set to 4 percent annually, a number commonly used in the literature, which pins down the quarterly discount factor to 0.99. Consistent with UK data, the steady-state value of the job …nding rate, x; and unemployment rate, u; are set equal to 0.4 and 0.3 respectively. This yields a value for the separation rate, = ux=((1 u)(1 x); equal to 0.29, which is in line with the UK estimate by Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) . Also the parameter B, which determines the steady-state proportion of hiring costs of total output, is di¢ cult to identify and is calibrated. Since there is not precise empirical evidence on this parameter, following Blanchard and Galí (2010) , it is set approximately to 0.0438 so that hiring costs represent one percent of total output, which seems a reasonable upper bound. Of special interest is the bargaining power parameter, , which represents the fraction of the total surplus attributed to the worker. The estimation was unable to identify this parameter and therefore it is set equal to 0:5, as estimated by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , so that the household and the …rm have the same bargaining power. Consequently, in order to satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition, which guarantees that allocations of the economy are Pareto optimal, the parameter of the elasticity of hiring costs with respect to labour market tightness, , is set equal to 1. 4 Another parameter that the estimation procedure was unable to identify is the replacement ratio, b , that represents the ratio of unemployment bene…ts to the past wage, which is set equal to 40%, as estimated by Bean (1994) and Nickell (1997) . The steady-state value of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, , is set equal to 6 so that the equilibrium markup is equal to 20%, as suggested in Britton, Larsen and Small (2000) .
The gross steady-state value of in ‡ation, , is set equal to 1.02, matching the average in ‡ation rate in the data. Finally, equations (14) and (20) pin down the parameter which is set equal to 0.9985. Ireland (2000) , given is equal to 6, it implies that approximately 20 percent of the …rms adjust their price each period, a value in line with Britton, Larsen and Small (2000) . It is worth noticing that, given the sizable standard error of this parameter, considerable uncertainty remains about the degree of nominal price rigidities in the economy.
The parameter estimates of equations (22) and (24) characterize the conduct of monetary policy. The estimate of the reaction coe¢ cient to the ‡uctuations of output from its steadystate, y , is 0.1229, and the estimate of the reaction coe¢ cient to the ‡uctuations of in ‡ation from the in ‡ation target, , is 1.1019. These estimates suggest that the monetary authority responded weakly to in ‡ation and output. This is in line with the estimates in Nelson (2003) and the documentation in Batini and Nelson (2009) . The estimates of equation (24) which describes the in ‡ation target, point out that preference, cost-push and technology shocks are all important components to determine the implicit in ‡ation target. In fact, the estimates of a , , and z are equal to 0.2375, 0.1428, and 0.2612 respectively. Interestingly, the monetary authority leaves the target to react more aggressively to technology shocks while gives less weight to preference and cost-push shocks.
The estimates of the exogenous disturbances show that preference shocks are highly persistent, with a equal to 0.9938, while cost-push and technology shocks are less so, with and z equal to 0.8557 and 0.6506 respectively. The estimates of the volatility of the exogenous disturbances shows that cost-push and technology shocks are highly volatile, with and z equal to 1.1144 and 0.6763 respectively, while shocks to the monetary policy rule, in ‡ation target, and household's preferences are of lower magnitude, with v , and a equal to 0.0008, 0.1420 and 0.2920 respectively. Clearly, these values suggest that cost-push and technology shocks are important components of economic ‡uctuations.
To investigate how the variables of the model react to each shock, Figures 2-3 plot the impulse responses of selected variables to one-standard-deviation of each of the exogenous shock. The …rst column in Figure 2 shows that after a one-standard-deviation technology shock, output and unemployment each rises, while in ‡ation falls. The fall in in ‡ation allows for an easing in monetary policy such that the nominal interest rate falls. Finally, the one period immediate increase in unemployment leads to a fall in labour market tightness which then increases due to the subsequent fall in unemployment. The second column in Figure 2 shows that a one-standard-deviation cost-push shock causes a fall in in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate, and a raise in output. The increase in output triggers a fall in unemployment that generates a raise in labour market tightness. Given the opposite reaction of output and in ‡ation in the case of technology and cost-push shocks, these disturbances behave as supply-side shocks, as mentioned in the outset. The third column in Figure 2 shows that a one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock translates into an increase in the nominal interest rate and into a fall in output. The fall in output generates an increase in unemployment and a consequent fall in the number of hires. Opposite shifts in the number of hires and unemployment generate a fall in labour market tightness. Since the monetary policy disturbance is serially uncorrelated, the reaction of each variable dies o¤ over a period of 1 year.
The …rst column in Figure 3 shows that after a one-standard-deviation preference shock both output and in ‡ation rise, leading the nominal interest rate, due to the modi…ed Taylor rule, to increase. Unemployment falls, therefore labour market tightness rises due to the lower response of vacancies. Finally, the second column in Figure 3 shows that a one-standarddeviation in ‡ation target shock decreases the nominal interest rate and raises in ‡ation, whose combined movements generate a decrease in the real interest rate and therefore a rise in output. Unemployment falls and so labour market tightness increases.
Looking across all these impulse responses also provides some insights into how the presence of labour market search and the introduction of a time-varying in ‡ation target a¤ect the transmission mechanism of a standard New Keynesian framework. For all shocks, the coexistence of these two features leaves the baseline transmission mechanism of a New Keynesian setting qualitatively una¤ected: all the variables respond to shocks similarly to a standard New Keynesian model without labour market search and time-varying in ‡ation target, as in Woodford (2003) . This corroborates the …ndings in Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2006) and Ireland (2007) who show that each of these two features on its own leaves the qualitative response of the underlying New Keynesian model unchanged. Nonetheless, as detailed below, the joint presence of labour market search and the time-varying in ‡ation target a¤ects the model's quantitative response to disturbances.
To understand the extent to which the movements of each variable are explained by the shocks, Table 2 reports the asymptotic forecast error variance decompositions for the estimated model. The results show that cost-push shocks explain low frequency movements in output and the nominal interest rate, while technology shocks play an important role in driving long run ‡uctuations in in ‡ation, labour market tightness and unemployment. On the other hand, preference and in ‡ation target shocks explain a small fraction of aggregate ‡uctuations.
To detail how the exogenous shocks have evolved during the estimation period, Figure   4 plots the estimate of each shock using the Kalman smoothing algorithms from the statespace representation of the estimated model. These estimates point out that monetary policy shocks, either in the form of exogenous shocks to the in ‡ation target or to the policy rule, were of smaller magnitude compared to technology or cost-push shocks, suggesting that, in line with the …ndings of the forecast error variance decomposition, the latter had a more relevant role in a¤ecting aggregate ‡uctuations. These stochastic shocks, once fed into the state-space representation of the model, generate time series for all the model's variables.
This therefore allows the derivation of the unobserved time-varying in ‡ation target, which is plotted in Figure 5 against the observed in ‡ation. The …gure shows that during the 1970s the monetary authority translated adverse technology shocks into higher in ‡ation, by allowing the implicit in ‡ation target to grow. In the early 1980s, it had taken advantage of the positive supply shocks to reduce in ‡ation and it subsequently allowed the implicit in ‡ation target to grow throughout the 1990s. This is in line with the narrative evidence in Batini and Nelson (2009) .
As detailed at the outset, since this model is immune to Lucas'(1976) (2000), Boivin and Giannoni (2006) , Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Castelnuovo (2007) …nd that by responding more strongly to in ‡ation, monetary policy has stabilized the US economy more e¤ectively in the post-1980 period. Gambetti and Pappa (2008) using sign restrictions on a VAR …nd that the introduction of in ‡ation targeting is unable to explain the reduced volatility of in ‡ation in several economies. But while the results do support the importance of the way in which the monetary authority reacts to in ‡ation, it should also be noted that the model abstracts from some relevant attributes of the economy. For instance, it ignores the oil sector, which, as Blanchard and Galì (2007) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010) 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 Notes: Unobserved time-varying in ‡ation target (black line) and observed in ‡ation (pink line).
